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$25.95. 
ALAN G. PADGETI, Luther Seminary 
On the eve of his retirement from the Claremont School of Theology, 
David Griffin has authored two summary volumes which set forth in 
learned and clear outline his version of process philosophy in the tradition 
of Whitehead, Hartshorne, and Cobb. The first book, Reenchantment, is 
focused on his philosophy of religion, and it appears in the Cornell Studies 
in the Philosophy of Religion series, edited by W. P. Alston. The second 
book, Religion, is his proposal for the current science-and-religion dialogue, 
and it has come out in a series he himself edits with SUNY Press in 
Constructive Postmodern Thought. Both books are well worth reading, 
especially for any scholar interested in the process school of thought con-
cerning either the philosophy of religion, or in the growing field of science-
and-religion, where indeed process thought has an important following. 
While the school of process philosophy is hardly monolithic, Griffin has 
provided us with a useful summary of one significant variant in that tradi-
tion, for the benefit of students and teachers alike. 
We begin with philosophy of religion. The title of Griffin's book 
requires some explanation. In his classic work, The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (1905), the great German sociologist Max Weber argued 
that the spirit of modem capitalism (i.e., modem purpose-driven rationali-
ty) has lead to a "disenchantment" with the world, a pragmatism in which 
value choices and meaning are merely subjective and thus irrational 
according to the rational standards of modernity. Griffin wants to present 
us with a postmodern worldview that, while completely "natural" is also 
value-laden, fully rational and fully scientific: a "reenchantment" of nature. 
He finds this in the metaphysics of Whitehead. Griffin argues that his phi-
losophy is a version of naturalism, because it forbids miracles (understood 
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as interruptions of the natural order of events). 
I doubt that many philosophers will find this definition of naturalism 
very persuasive. It seems to confuse the cause with the effect. True, meta-
physical naturalism implies that miracles are impossible. But the impossi-
bility of miracles does not imply metaphysical naturalism, and does not 
provide us with much of a definition of naturalism. On such a definition, 
deism will turn out to be a form of naturalism - which is absurd. 
Metaphysics in the tradition of Whitehead is far better described as 
panpsychism or panentheism. 
It is practically impossible to justify, in books of this sort, the basic meta-
physical principles of process thought. Griffin usually refers us to 
Whitehead for these points. For example, I have never found Whitehead's 
notion of "actual entity" either attractive or plausible. Such a position is 
assumed rather than justified. Thus, Griffin has chosen a kind of presup-
positional approach, which reminded this reader of Cornelius Van Til. His 
basic presuppositions are spelled out, explained, and then defended 
against opposition. They are not, in the first instance, justified in general 
terms. The first chapter of Reenchantment sets forth his definition of process 
philosophy, and the ten "core doctrines" which are the heart of the book. 
Some of these principles are formal, some are methodological, and some 
are both substantial and particular. The rest of the volume explains and 
expands upon these key ideas in dialogue with issues and thinkers of the 
day. This is not, then, a standard textbook in philosophy of religion, but 
the clarification and exposition of one particular kind of philosophy (which 
might make a useful supplementary classroom text). 
Among the formal doctrines, I applaud the first: one of the central tasks 
of philosophy is the integration of moral, aesthetic and religious intuitions 
with the most general doctrines of science. I am less convinced by his 
ninth doctrine: the "ideals of contemporary civilization" need the "cosmo-
logical support" of philosophy. He spells this out more fully in chapter 8, 
where he seeks to ground moral absolutes in cosmology. This is where the 
reenchantment comes in. It turns out, however, that "cosmology" in ethics 
reduces to theism, in practical terms, in this chapter. This is a strange way 
of grounding ethics in the cosmos! His views would be better developed 
in dialogue with advocates of contemporary natural law and divine com-
mand theories, which are strangely absent from this chapter. 
Another formal doctrine (no. 3) asserts that "hard core common sense" 
propositions must be affirmed in any rational worldview. Griffin explains 
that these are "notions we inevitably presuppose in practice" (30). The 
danger here is in packing these so-called universal truths of common sense 
with our own favorite biases. Alas, Griffin falls into this trap when he 
claims (in chapters 2, 8 and 10) that belief in a Holy Reality and in norma-
tive values are among these supposedly inevitable assumptions. This rais-
es the question of how we justify a particular proposition as "hard core." 
Griffin seems to reject Kant's approach. So how do we know they are true? 
"We directly prehend these realities" (357). This epistemology seems to 
fall apart upon careful scrutiny. Does he mean to claim that we directly 
"prehend" moral absolutes? That flies smack in the face of empirical evi-
dence, unless some kind of epistemic epicycles are added in to explain why 
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so many humans are deluded about these universal, moral principles we 
all directly prehend. 
This last comment leads to one of the most controversial aspects of 
Griffin's work. In both of these books, Griffin is at pains to defend a "non-
sensationist doctrine of perception" in which our access to the external 
world is not limited to the five senses. 
I am myself tempted to put the idea that we are limited in our perception 
of external reality to the five bodily senses among those hard core common 
sense notions mentioned earlier. But no, Griffin calls this "sensationism" 
(as Whitehead did), and is at pains to defend the idea that we have other 
means of access to reality. Therefore, Griffin defends ESP and parapsychol-
ogy in his book on religion and science. I confess I am still dubious. 
Scientists do not doubt ESP because they are prejudiced against it (as Griffin 
thinks), but because they have tested it, and found no positive evidence in 
favor of it. Here Griffin appears to leave behind the scientific method. 
Among the other rather difficult doctrines which Griffin is at pains to 
explain is the doctrine (no. 5) that all objects are aggregates ("societies") of 
"occasions of experience" and the corresponding notion (no. 4) that all gen-
uine entities have some degree of freedom and experience. The problem of 
Griffin's presuppositional approach raises its head once again. He is very 
good at showing the helpfulness of his core doctrines if we believe them to 
be true. But why should we accept them in the first place? These core doc-
trines of Whitehead's metaphysics are the most difficult to believe. Why are 
the real entities these tiny events called actual occasions, rather than the 
everyday objects of common sense? Surely a pen or a person is a real thing, 
but made up of parts. Why should we assume that the parts are what is 
truly real? Modem physics teaches us that the smallest particles have a 
very limited sort of concrete reality. Why not start with the reality of every-
day things, and then move on in ontology? Such a common sense approach 
would appear to be what Griffin is committed to by other, formal doctrines 
in his system. He does not appear to notice this internal tension. Griffin is 
content to refer to Whitehead's own work for such justification. Too often 
he simply appeals to Whitehead, as if that was the final test of truth. 
Griffin does go beyond both Hartshorne and Whitehead, in developing 
his "doubly dipolar theism" (doctrine no. 8). Whitehead taught that God 
was a single actual entity, with both a consequent and a primordial nature. 
Griffin follows Hartshorne in seeing God as a temporal series, a "serially 
ordered society of divine occasions of experience," just like other things. 
One dipolarity, then, is between the concrete states of God's life, and the 
abstract divine essence. To this is added to the earlier dipolarity, as Joim 
Cobb argued it should be in 1965 (in A Christian Natural Theology). 
Anyone interested in process theology should read this work with care. 
Assuming certain basic positions in Whitehead's metaphysics, Griffin does 
a fine job of carefully spelling out what this overall position would mean in 
the philosophy of religion. He covers the right topics, and lays out his 
position with skill. This summary of process philosophy of religion will 
serve future generations well. 
The second work by Griffin under review, Religion and Scientific 
Naturalism, can be understood as a development of the other book (which 
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was in fact published one year later). Griffin is at pains in this work to 
overcome the conflicts between religion and science. We can agree with 
him that this is a laudatory goal, with no little cultural import. At the same 
time, however, the work has some of the problems of the earlier book. It is 
a long essay of the form, "If we assume that process metaphysics is correct, 
then such-and-such is the valuable result." He is surely right in under-
standing that, if one does assume that process thought is correct, the con-
flicts between religion and science will be overcome. But the metaphysical 
cure may be worse than the intellectual cold. 
Griffin does a good job of covering many of the major issues in the 
current religion and science debate, as these touch upon philosophical 
topics. I am very much in favor with the thesis of the first chapter, that 
we need to integrate science and religion into a philosophical worldview 
(5). But I cannot accept the assertion that modern science "necessarily 
presupposes naturalism" (11). This highly controversial point is defend-
ed in chapter 3, where he considers the proposal for a "theistic science," 
in dialogue with Al Plantinga and Phil Johnson. Griffin does not come 
off well as an historian of ideas in these chapters. Theism (which he calls 
"supernaturalistic theism") has its roots in the classical period, not in the 
"mechanistic view of nature" of the Enlightenment where Griffin places 
it (27). The mechanistic worldview is a part of modernism, having more 
to do with deism than with classical Western religion. Likewise, the 
"scheme of primary and secondary causation" (38-40) is a product of the 
high Middle Ages, and in any case Griffin gives a very unsympathetic 
explanation of this Christian philosophy of science. In the long run, 
Griffin presents a wholly unconvincing case that belief in God and mira-
cles undermines natural science. He misunderstands the point that nat-
ural science is supposed to explore the world of secondary causes, which 
by definition are stable and invariable. That God may, by absolute 
omnipotence, act in other ways is quite irrelevant, since this claim 
belongs to theology not natural science. That was the medieval and early 
modern viewpoint, the division of labor between science and theology 
that allowed for the rise of early modern science. The sooner we return 
to it, the better, in my view! Griffin's chapter on religion and the rise of 
modern science, then, needs to be set in the 14th and 15th century, not the 
17th. He focuses too exclusively upon the "mechanistic" philosophy of 
nature, which comes in only later and is much easier for him to reject 
along with all "supernaturalism." 
Having set forth the superiority of his "naturalistic theism" to his sat-
isfaction, Griffin considers several themes in religion and science. These 
include parapsychology, the mind-body problem, the Big Bang, and 
evolution. Whitehead fits well with parapsychology and evolution, but 
not so well with modern cosmology. Some panentheists like Phil 
Clayton have come to embrace the doctrine of creation ex nihilo on scien-
tific and philosophical grounds, thus rejecting traditional Whiteheadian 
philosophy. Griffin still holds out for his "creation out of chaos" and 
some sort of eternal universe alongside God. Both of these positions 
seem inconsistent with modern science, but Griffin strives mightily to 
defend them. 
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In the current renaissance of dialogue and debate concerning science 
and religion, there is a significant presence of process thinkers. 
Important scholars in this field embrace a process perspective, even if 
they modify some aspects. Examples of this position include Ian 
Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, John Haught, and Phil Clayton, although 
each one of these authors modifies traditional Whiteheadian positions to 
some degree. It is good to have in this volume by Griffin are-statement 
of the classical Whiteheadian position in the current religion and science 
dialogue. I recommend this work to anyone interested in the topic of 
process theology and natural science. Taken together, these books rep-
resent a major summary of Griffin's philosophy, and stand as a fitting 
capstone to his career at Claremont. 
Naturalism: A Critical Analysis, edited by Wm. Lane Craig and J. P. 
Moreland. London and New York: Routledge, 2000. Pp. ix and 286. $90 
(hardcover) . 
RICHARD CREEL, Ithaca College, Ithaca, New York 
Naturalism: A Critical Analysis is a valuable volume for those who 
would like to bring themselves up to date on criticisms of naturalism as a 
worldview and on the comparative merits of theism as a worldview. The 
eleven authors of this volume are convinced that under extended scruti-
ny the philosophical naturalism that dominated the philosophical scene 
for most of the twentieth century has now been shown to generate dilem-
mas and have costs that are daunting at best and prohibitive at worst 
whereas theism is proving to be quite resilient. Each of the ten chapters 
of Naturalism was written by a different author (the first article is co-
authored). The first three chapters are on epistemology, the next four on 
ontology, the eighth on value theory, and the last two on natural theolo-
gy. Three aims shared by most chapters are (1) to identify phenomena or 
problems that naturalism has not dealt with adequately, and perhaps 
cannot deal with adequately, (2) to explain why a consistent naturalism 
must be strictly physicalist and therefore eschew emergent, supervenient, 
mental, and abstract properties and entities, and (3) to show that philo-
sophical theism is a more comprehensive and adequate world view than 
is philosophical naturalism. Most of these authors have published exten-
sively on the topics about which they write in Naturalism, so to some 
extent their articles (written for this volume) serve as valuable introduc-
tions to and updates of their work. In such a short review I cannot sum-
marize and critique each of ten wide-ranging, technical articles, so I have 
chosen to summarize each chapter without critique. The title of each 
chapter precedes my summary of it. 
Farewell to philosophical naturalism 
Paul Moser and David Yandell begin by posing a dilemma for natural-
ism. If naturalism cleaves to strict physicalism, it cannot account for the 
